— 2022 —
A report on legislative professionalism for the state of New Mexico
with Dr. Timothy Krebs
As polarization and gridlock continue to grip national politics, Americans are increasingly looking to states to remedy the nation’s most significant challenges. The burden has fallen to the states to address complex issues such as health care, immigration, infrastructure, voting rights, energy, and the environment. Indeed, states’ responses to our current crisis—the coronavirus pandemic—illustrates just how consequential state-level policy making and implementation are for the average American. Attention on states has become even more relevant in recent months as the Supreme Court’s new conservative majority begins to assert its influence on matters of federalism, such as in the 2022 landmark decision Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization that turned abortion policy over to the states.
But this was not always the case. In the 1960s, state governments—particularly their legislatures—were in crisis. Few legislatures had the capacity to address the daunting issues (particularly civil rights and poverty) that were creating massive political, social, and economic unrest in our states and cities. The New York Times Magazine famously referred to them as a study in slow motion that “lumber about their business with all the grace and efficiency of a dinosaur” (Desmond 1955, 15). The Times urged states to reform their legislatures’ many “obsolete features” that result in sessions that are a “recurrent, unavoidable public calamity” (15). For example, professional organizations such as the Council of State Governments in 1946, the American Political Science Association in 1954, the National Legislative Conference in 1961, and the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures in 1971 were among those who called for strengthening state legislatures. A wave of legislative reforms across the country followed.
Legislative professionalism refers to the “enhancement of the capacity of the legislature to perform its role in the policy-making process” (Mooney 1994). The term can refer either to the attributes of the legislative institution or the characteristics of the people who serve in the legislature; frequently it refers to both. It should be noted that “professionalism” is not meant to suggest a degree of competency or skill. Rather, the term is used to characterize the capacity of legislatures and the degree to which legislators’ primary career is as a legislator.
How do we identify professional legislatures? Scholars of state legislatures generally agree on two factors that measure the capacity to legislate: session length and support staff. A third factor, member salary, is often used to measure professionalism as well. But this measure has more to do with the characteristics of the people who serve in the legislature than the legislature itself. Rather, we prefer to think of legislators along a spectrum of legislative careerism. For example, do state legislators work full-time or part-time at legislative tasks? And how do legislators identify themselves? Do they have careers outside the legislature?
After almost a century of reforms and analyses from scholars of state legislatures, we can make some conclusions about the consequences of legislative professionalization. The purpose of this report is to, first, compare the New Mexico state legislature’s level of professionalism with states of similar population size and demographics and, second, to present the key findings from work dedicated to the study of legislative professionalization. Some consequences are clear; others are less so. We will leave it to you, the reader, to determine the relative value of each finding.
Based on accepted measures of professionalism and data available up to the 2015 biennium, we find that the New Mexico state legislature:
Meets an average of 70.53 legislative days during each biennium, the 3rd shortest in the nation.
Spends an average of $394,510 per legislator during each biennium on staff, which ranks 33rd out of 50 in staff spending (or the 18th lowest in the nation).
Maintains about 168 permanent staff—about 1.5 per legislator—which ranks 36 out of 50 states related to employing permanent staff (15th lowest).
Has the lowest legislator salary in the nation, at zero dollars. New Mexico remains the only state in the nation whose legislators do not receive a salary.
Ranks near the bottom of the two most commonly used aggregate measures of professionalism.
Can be characterized as an amateur legislature with dual-career legislators.
While some conclusions are decidedly mixed, based on the research reviewed below we feel confident in saying that greater legislative professionalism produces:
Greater incumbency advantage in elections, but more contested elections as more would-be challengers make the effort to contest incumbents even when their odds of victory remain low.
Less membership turnover and thus more stable memberships.
More sophisticated and expensive campaigns for office.
Less incumbent electoral vulnerability to political and economic shifts, especially those related to the popularity of governors.
An increase in the number of progressively ambitious candidates, ones who will more carefully monitor their constituents needs and who will endeavor to represent them accurately in order climb the political ladder.
An increase in the effort that legislators put toward to being representatives.
More effective and capable lawmaking.
More effective bargaining with governors.
More stable coalitions in roll-call votes as legislators turn more to party leaders to help their reelections by producing winning coalitions in support of party objectives.
Greater ability to oversee executive branch agencies.
Stronger regulations around lobbying and campaign finance.
Members who are focused more on reelection than legislation.
Greater substantive representation.
Our recommendations are the following:
Staffing: Increase the number of permanent legislative staff, especially staff connected to individual legislators as opposed to staff that might work for interim committees such as the Legislative Finance Committee or the other permanent, year-round policy committees. Most legislators in NM do not have dedicated staff; they only have access to staff during the legislative session and/or when their work outside the session puts them in contact with institutional staff members. Additional staff support is the best way to increase legislative capacity. Among other benefits, increasing professional staff and broadening their distribution in the legislature will mean greater ability for the legislature to check executive agencies and governmental programs, and for individual legislators to build expertise on policy and to conduct constituency service vital to their constituencies.
Salary: Work to provide a salary to legislators not because of its effects on the legislature, and more because it is the fair thing to do. Legislative salary as an indicator of professionalism is linked to a number of important phenomena such as who runs, time spent on the job, legislative productivity and non-voting, district legislation, good government reforms, economic development, etc., but the overall effect of salary is probably not as important as staffing. The question here of course will be where that salary is set.
Days in Session: Days in session should be increased to enhance legislative capacity, especially in bargaining with the executive. Increasing session lengths will allow the legislature tobecome more involved in making policy, in shaping the budget, and running the government itself. As a result, the legislature will become a constant presence that cannot be ignored by the executive or anyone else.
— 2015 —-
Crony Capitalism, Corruption and the Economy in the State of New Mexico
With Sharif Amlani, Dr. Julia Hellwege and Dr. Lisa Sanchez
The Committee for Economic Development (CED)—a Washington, DC-based non- profit, nonpartisan business-led public policy organization—recently released a study outlining their concerns about the rise of crony capitalism in American politics. The term refers to the unhealthy relationship between some private interests (e.g. business, anti-business interests, professions, and social groups) and government. Deals are struck that reward winners on the basis of political influence rather than merit. Like Olson (1982), Coates and Heckelman (2003a, 2003b) and others (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997), the CED argues that such deals inhibit the productive reallocation of society’s resources and reduce innovation and economic growth. Examples of such deals include cash subsidies, tax preferences, earmarked appropriations, no-bid contracts, and regulatory and trade protection. They can be crafted to benefit virtually any sector of the economy, and though each alleged deal has its defenders—else it would not exist—the list of questionable private sector-government interactions is long. The goal of the CED report is to raise awareness nationally of the concern surrounding this trend in an effort towards rebuilding Americans’ confidence in a more sustainable system of capitalism.
The purpose of our report, Crony Capitalism, Corruption and the Economy in the State of New Mexico, is to examine crony capitalism in the state of New Mexico. Our focus is on the relationship between business and government, primarily because the private sector is integral to a state’s economic growth. Furthermore, New Mexico is an interesting case to examine crony capitalism due to the state economy’s heavy reliance on public funding. Indeed, New Mexico’s economy is more dependent on the federalgovernment than any other state in the nation. Because so much of the state’s economy is dependent on public funds, the potential for crony capitalistic behavior is high. Sadly, New Mexico continues to score near the bottom of reputable watchdog and political reporter state corruption indexes, and has been rocked by a number of high profile corruption cases in recent years. The most recent—occurring only months before the release of this report—involves former Secretary of State Dianna Duran, who resigned from office and accepted a plea deal related to charges of fraud, embezzlement, money laundering, and other crimes related to allegedly converting thousands of dollars in campaign contributions to her personal use in 2013 and 2014.
Using the CED’s national study as a guide, the purpose of this project will be threefold: (1) to examine the conditions that create the potential for crony capitalism in New Mexico; (2) to conduct brief studies of cases where crony capitalistic behavior seemed to be present; and (3) to suggest policy reforms to lessen the potential for crony capitalism. We argue, first, that crony capitalism in the state of New Mexico is defined mostly by rent extraction rather than rent seeking. The long history of political corruption in the state, coupled with its refusal to enact rule changes that discourage corrupt behavior, has created incentive structures that all but force the business community to engage in crony capitalistic behavior.
Second, we argue that crony capitalism is not a binary condition; rather, it exists along a continuum. Some private-public sector relationships, like some tax subsidies, are legitimate policy choices that can, under the right conditions, successfully grow the economy. Others, like predatory lending practices, clearly benefit only a small section of society while spreading significant economic costs to the general public. Still others, like pay-to-play scandals, are illegal and corrupt, and have tremendous short and long- term economic costs on the state.
To combat crony capitalism, we recommend three actions:
Require Greater Disclosure. A prerequisite for holding public officials accountable is providing full and free access to relevant information. In the case of crony capitalism, this means full disclosure of campaign contributions and lobbying activity. Disclosure empowers public oversight and accountability in the government decision-making process. The state should (a) require donors to disclose their employers; (b) require lobbyists to disclose the bills and issues on behalf of which they lobby; (c) amend the Campaign Reporting Act of New Mexico to compel public disclosure of all possible information about the campaign spending of political action committees (PACs) and other non-candidate campaign participants without crossing the constitutional boundaries established by the court; and (d) improve online access to campaign finance and lobbying information.
Establish an Ethics Commission. Ethics commissions have long been believed to be an important tool in curbing abuses in government (see Smith 2003). Currently, New Mexico is one of only eight states that does not have an ethics commission. We believe establishing such a commission would have a positive effect on confidence in the New Mexican political system.
Conduct Regular and Rigorous Evaluations of Tax Subsidy Programs. New Mexico issued 860 subsidies between 2011 and 2013 for a total of $262,699,040. New Mexico should follow the lead of other states such as Alaska, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, and Maryland and charge an appropriate committee or agency with conducting a regular and rigorous evaluation of all existing programs. The programs need to be studied often enough to provide policymakers with up-to-date information, while allowed the time to produce thorough, detailed studies.
Finally, and most important, is our belief that high public corruption and cronyism is a key reason for New Mexico’s lackluster economic growth (ranked by Business Insider as 49 out of 50).1 This belief is grounded in the well-established evidence from international- and state-level research discussed below. The lesson is clear: if New Mexico is to ever recapture the economic vitality it experienced as a key terminal along the Santa Fe Trail, Camino Real and, later, Route 66, it must root out cronyism and corruption in its state government.